Abstract-We derive an exponentially decaying upper-bound on the unnormalized amount of information leaked to the wiretapper in Wyner's wire-tap channel setting. We characterize the exponent of the bound as a function of the randomness used by the encoder. This exponent matches that of the recent work of Hayashi [11] which is, to the best of our knowledge, the best exponent that exists in the literature. Our proof is exclusively based on an i.i.d. random coding construction while that of [11], in addition, requires the use of random universal hash functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] introduced the notion of the wire-tap channel ( To this end, Alice encodes W as a codeword X ∈ X n and sends it via n consecutive uses of the channel. Bob observes the output sequence of V, Y ∈ Y n and estimates W given Y. On the other side, Eve has access to Z ∈ Z n (the output sequence of W), given which, she attempts to infer about W .
Wyner (in case when W is degraded with respect to V) [1] and later Csiszár and Körner (in a more general context of V being more capable than W) [2] showed that, given any input distribution P X , Alice can communicate reliably to Bob at any rate R up to I(X; Y ) − I(X; Z),
(when (X, Y ) ∼ P X (x)V(x|y) and (X, Z) ∼ P X (x)W(z|x)) while keeping the rate of information leaked to Eve about W as small as desired; i.e. guaranteeing
for any ǫ > 0, using sufficiently large n.
Wyner's measure of secrecy allows one to investigate the trade-off between the message rate and the information leakage rate but is too weak from the security point of view; even if the amount of information Eve learns about the message W normalized to the number of channel uses vanishes asymptotically, the amount itself can grow unboundedly as the block-length increases. Therefore, it is natural to remove the normalization factor in (2) and ask for strong secrecy:
Maurer and Wolf showed that, the highest achievable rate (1) under strong secrecy requirement does not change [3] . Classical achievability constructions [1] , [4] are based on associating each message w ∈ {1, . . . , M } with a sub-code of size M ′ = exp(nR ′ ) and transmitting a randomly chosen codeword from that sub-code to communicate w. The reliability of the code is ensured by keeping the total rate R ′ + R below I(X; Y ). Furthermore, by varying the rate R ′ from 0 to I(X; Z), the upper-bound on the information leakage rate, 1 n I(W ; Z), is controlled. Particularly, by choosing the rate R ′ just below I(X; Z), the weak secrecy is established.
An alternative way to approach the secrecy problem is to establish secrecy through channel resolvability [5] - [7] . The resolvability of a channel W : X → Z is the minimum entropy rate required at its input such that its output distribution approximates a desired (product) distribution Q n Z and is equal to I(X; Z) if Q Z ≡ P Z , the distribution induced by the input distribution P X [5] , [8] - [10] .
For any fixed message w ∈ {1, . . . , M } the output of Eve's channel has distribution P Z|W =w . It is not difficult to see that the secrecy is guaranteed if P Z|W =w 'well approximates' the product distribution P n Z by setting the sub-codes' rate R ′ just above I(X; Z). In particular, if we measure the quality of approximation by asking the unnormalized Kullback-Leibler divergence between P Z|W =w and P n Z to be small, strong secrecy will be established. Indeed, in [5] , [7] it has been shown that the information leakage, I(W ; Z) will be exponentially small in n provided that R ′ is above the resolvability of wiretapper's the channel I(X; Z).
Definition 1. Given R, R
′ and W, a number E is a secrecy exponent for the wire-tapper channel W, if there exist a sequence of reliable coding schemes of rate R, requiring the entropy rate R ′ at the encoder, for which lim inf n→∞ − 1 n log[I(W ; Z)] ≥ E. In [5] , [7] the secrecy exponent is derived using i.i.d. random coding ensemble. More specifically, each message w ∈ {1, . . . , M } is associated with a sub-code whose codewords are independently (and independent of the codewords of the sub-codes associated to other messages) sampled from the i.i.d. random coding ensemble. The exponent is derived by upperbounding the ensemble-expectation of D(P Z|W P n Z |P W ) and then concluding that there exists a sequence of codes in the ensemble using which the information leakage decays at least as fast as E[D(P Z|W P n Z |P W )] does. The secrecy exponent of Hou and Kramer in [7] is derived based on their resolvability proof of [10, § III-A] which is simple but results in a small exponent. However, by applying the method described in [10, § III-B] to the wire-tap channel setting a larger exponent can be obtained which is equivalent to that of Hayashi in [5] .
In [11] , Hayashi improves his secrecy exponent by privacy amplification which requires a slightly different construction than those used in [5] , [7] , [10] . In addition to a code of size M M ′ whose codewords are sampled independently from the i.i.d. random coding ensemble, a hash function is sampled from the ensemble of universal hash functions from {1, . . . , M M ′ } to {1, . . . , M } and revealed to Alice, Bob and Eve. A message m ∈ {1, . . . , M } is communicated by first sending a randomly chosen codeword from the code and then using the hash function to map the index of the sent codeword to an element of {1, . . . , M }. The expected information leakage (where the expectation is taken over the i.i.d. random coding ensemble and the universal hash functions ensemble) is then upper-bounded to show that the exponent of the bound is a secrecy exponent.
In this paper, we derive an exponentially decaying upperbound on E[D(P Z|W =w P n Z )], where the expectation is taken over the i.i.d. random coding ensemble (i.e., the construction used in [5] , [7] , [10] ), by analyzing the deviations of P Z|W =w from its mean. It then follows (by standard expurgation arguments) that for ∀ǫ > 0, there exist a code of essentially the same rate R, using which max w D(
As already noted in [7] , this is a worst-case measure of secrecy in contrast to I(W ; Z) which is an average-case measure of secrecy. In addition, this shows that our lower-bound on
is a secrecy exponent. This exponent matches that of [11] which is larger than those of [5] , [7] , [10] .
II. NOTATION
We use uppercase letters (like X) to denote a random variable and corresponding lowercase version (x) for a realization of that random variable. The boldface letters denote sequences of length n. The i-th element of a sequence x is denoted as x i . We denote finite sets by script-style uppercase letters like S. The cardinality of set S is denoted by |S|. For a positive integer m,
{1, 2, . . . , m}. R denotes the set of real numbers andR = R ∪ {−∞, +∞} is the set of extended real numbers. We write f (n)
We denote the set of distributions on alphabet X as P(X ). If P ∈ P(X ), P n ∈ P(X n ) denotes the product distribution
We denote the type of a sequence x ∈ X n byP x ∈ P(X ) and the conditional type of y ∈ Y n given x ∈ X n byV y|x : X → Y (see [12, Chapter 2] for formal definitions).
A distributionP ∈ P(X ) is an n-type if nP (x) ∈ N ≥0 for ∀x ∈ X . We denote the set of n-types on X aŝ P n (X ) P(X ) and use the fact that
IfP ∈P n (X ), we denote the set of all sequences of typê
III. RESULT
In the rest of the paper (X, Z) ∈ X × Z denotes the pair of random variables whose joint distribution is P X,Z (x, z) = P X (x)W(z|x) where P X is a fixed input distribution. For simplicity (and with no essential loss of generality) we assume the supp(P X ) = X and supp(P Z ) = Z. Following [4] we consider the following random code construction: for every message
independently from the product distribution P n X . In order to communicate the message w, Alice picks w
uniformly at random and transmits X w,w ′ . Given such a construction, for every w ∈ [[M ]] and z ∈ Z n , the conditional output distribution of W is
which is an average of i.i.d. random variables and
Theorem 1. Using the construction described above, for ∀w ∈
with
where
Remark. F 0 (P X , W, λ) is a convex function of λ (cf. Appendix E-B) passing through the origin with the slope
The only random quantity involved in the divergence D(P Z|W =w P n Z ) is the conditional distribution P Z|W =w whose expectation is P n Z as shown in (5) . To prove Theorem 1 we shall analyze the deviations of the random variables P Z|W (z|w) from their mean, P n Z (z).
As an immediate corollary to Theorem 1 we have: Corollary 2. For any input distribution P X and a pair of rates R and R ′ , there exists a reliable code of rate R using which, for any message distribution P W ,
where P e denotes the decoding error probability of Bob and E r is Gallager's random coding exponent [13, Chapter 5] .
Corollary 2 is proved in Appendix B.
Using (5), it is easy to see that E[U n (z|w)] = 1.
Using the linearity of expectation, we have:
To prove Theorem 1, we shall use the following result.
Lemma 3. For P ∈ P(Z), let
and
Having proved Lemma 3, Theorem 1 follows by using (11) in (8) and [12, Lemma 2.6 ] to conclude
Using (10), the equivalence of (12) and (6) is shown in Appendix D. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof of Lemma 3:
Pick anyP ∈P n (Z) and observe that for z ∈ TP ,
For every P ∈ P(Z) and stochastic matrix Q : Z → X define
Thus, using (4),
LetÃ A X,Z (P ;Q) for all conditional typesQ ⊂R, (15) and observe that |Ã| = O(n |X ||Z| ). Set A {a ∈Ã : a > −∞} and for each a ∈ A define
where TQ(z) is theQ-shell of z and the union is over conditional typesQ : Z → X (thus contains O(n |X ||Z| ) shells). Now we can rewrite (14) as
with N a |{w ′ : X w,w ′ ∈ T a (z)}| denotes the number of codewords of C w in T a (z). Since the codewords are independent, N a is a Binomial random variable with parameters M ′ and success probability
In the above, second equality follows sinceQ-shells are disjoint, the third equality follows from [12, Lemma 2.6] (a similar approach is used in [14] to express a quantity of interest as a weighted sum of Binomial random variables).
In Appendix C-A we compute the value of
and, in particular, show that
with equality iff a = D(P X|Z P X |P ). and split (17) as
For non-negative s and t and u s + t we have
where the inequality follows since ln(1 + t/s) ≤ t/s. Consequently,
Moreover, since
We now upper-bound each of the above expectations to complete the proof.
First we note that for any constant c ∈ R,
In particular,
One can check that (see Fig. 2 )
where the last inequality follows since E[S n ] = 1 − E[T n ] ≤ 1 as S n and T n are both non-negative random variables.
Using (25) in (23) we conclude that
We now have,
where the last equality follows since
In the above, (a) follows by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, (b) follows since
and finally (28) follows from (18) and (19). Similar to (27),
Putting (27) and (28) in (26) together with (29) in (22) we conclude that
We now observe that:
ii. by (20), one and only one of E 2 (P X,Z , R ′ ,P ) or
This simplifies (30) to
In Appendix C-B we show that
Using the above in (32) concludes the proof.
V. DISCUSSION
We derived a lower-bound on the secrecy exponent of the wire-tap channel using i.i.d. random codes. Comparing (6) with [11, Equation (12)], we see that our exponent is equal to that of [11] which is the best lower-bound on the secrecy exponent among those reported in [5] , [7] , [11] . However, our proof is based on a pure i.i.d. random coding construction and does not require the ensemble of universal hash functions as an additional tool. Our proof can be regarded as a generalization of that of [10, § III-A]; instead of partitioning the set of output sequences Z n into two classes of typical and atypical sequences, we partition it into O(n |Z| ) type-classes to upper-bound the expected unnormalized Kullback-Leibler divergence between the output distribution and the desired product distribution P n Z . Furthermore, we believe that the method described here has merit in showing the doubly exponential nature of the concentration of the output distribution; as we see in (4), the output distribution P Z|W (z|w) is an average of M ′ i.i.d. random variables. If the distribution of the summands was independent of M ′ , the average would have concentrated around its mean exponentially fast in M ′ , that is doubly exponentially fast in n. Although this is not the case, we see in the proof of Lemma 3 that among polynomially many summands in (17), there is only one, corresponding to a = D(P X|Z P X |P z ) that has a significant contribution to the mean of U n (z|w) (which is a normalized version of P Z|W (z|w)); the rest all have exponentially small means. Applying the Chernoff bound to this particular term (and depending on R ′ potentially some of the adjacent terms) we see that if R ′ > D(P X|Z P X |P z ) the dominant term concentrates around its mean doubly exponentially fast in n. Particularly, there exists a class of wiretapper channels for which U n (z|w) will consist of exclusively this dominant term. 3 The achievability constructions of [5] , [7] , [10] , [11] are based on i.i.d. random codes. It is an open question whether random constant-composition codes [12] will lead to a better secrecy exponent. We believe that our method is easily adaptable to other types of random coding. Another important subject in the context of wire-tap channel is to derive nontrivial upper-bounds on the secrecy exponent.
The performance of a wire-tap code is measured via two quantities, the error probability and the information leakage, which are both shown to be exponentially decaying as a function of the block-length n. The trade-off between these exponents is recently studied in [15] .
We conclude our discussion by remarking that, as shown in [2] , for general channels V and W, any message rate up to
where V ⊸− −X⊸− −(Y, Z) form a Markov chain, is achievable. Our results (and also those of others cited) are straightforwardly extensible to the case when the channels are prefixed with a channel P X|V and auxiliary random variable V is used.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF (5)
The right-hand-side of (4) is the average of identically distributed random variables. The mean of each of them is
In the above, the first equality follows since the codewords are sampled from the product distribution P n X .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF COROLLARY 2
Let M exp(nR) and construct
] by sampling each codeword independently from the product distribution P n X . As we already described, in order to communicate
uniformly at random and transmits X w,w ′ over the channel. The union of this codebooks C
n . Hence, using this ensemble for communicating over V, for each w ∈ [[2M ]], the expected decoding error probability is upper-bounded as
due to [13, Theorem 5.6.2]. In the above,Ŵ andŴ ′ denote, respectively, the maximum likelihood estimations of W and W ′ given Y, the output sequence of V. Consequently,
Likewise, Theorem 1 implies
Therefore, there exists a code
w in the ensemble using which we simultaneously have 4 :
Since each of the summands in (37) is positive, there exist a subset
Similarly since the summands in (38) are positive, there exists a subset
Since
The sub-code defined by the messages in W, w∈W C * w has rate R and, using that, for any message distribution P W on W, we have:
due to (39), and
due to (40).
APPENDIX C DERIVATION OF EXPONENTS FOR THE PROOF OF LEMMA 3

A. Derivation of E b and It's Properties
Proposition 4. Let E b (P X,Z , P, a) be defined as in (19). Then,
where G 0 is defined in (9). 4 Markov inequality implies for at least 2 3 of the codes in the ensemble,
Similarly for at least 2 3 of the codes in the ensemble,
Therefore, for at least 1 3 of the codes in the ensemble both (37) and (38) hold simultaneously.
Proof: Let
denote the information density function for the joint distribution P X,Z for the sake of brevity. Using (13),
Now, we have
where (*) follows since D(Q P X|Z |P ) is a convex function ofQ and A X,Z (P ;Q) is a linear function ofQ. Therefore, D(Q P X|Z |P ) − ρA X,Z (P ;Q) is also a convex function of Q and we can swap the min and the max. Now,
with equality iffQ(x|z) ∝ P X|Z (x|z) exp[ρι X,Z (x, z)] (using the concavity of logarithm). Therefore,
Remark. It is easy to verify that E b (P X,Z , P, a) is a convex function of a. Furthermore, (42) implies E b (P X,Z , P, a) ≥ a with equality at a = D(P X|Z P X |P ).
B. Derivation of E 1 and E 2
Proof of (33a): Using (31a),
where (*) follows since E b (P X,Z , P, a) is convex in a. Using (41) we have
where again (*) follows since G 0 (P X,Z , P, ρ) is convex in ρ (cf. Appendix E-A). We then note that the minimum of the linear term (ρ−λ)a over the choices of a is −∞ unless ρ = λ. Therefore, the result of (44) is
Plugging the above into (43) completes the proof. Proof of (33b): Similarly, using (31b),
where (*) follows since E b (P X,Z , P, a) is convex in a. Using {D(P P Z ) − G 0 (P X,Z , P, λ)} where (*) follows since G 0 , defined in (9) is a linear function of P while D(P P Z ) is convex in P and we can swap the min and the max. The claim follows then by observing that D(P P Z ) − G 0 (P X,Z , P, λ) = z∈Z P (z) log P (z) P Z (z) − − log x∈X P X|Z (x|z) 1+λ P X (x|z) Proof: Pick s 1 < s 2 and t ∈ (0, 1). Lett 1 − t and s ts 1 +ts 2 . Then, Hölder's inequality implies
Taking the log of both sides of the above concludes the proof. (ii) g(s) log
Proof: The convexity of f (s) is trivial. To prove the convexity of g(s), let s 1 < s 2 and s = ts 1 +ts 2 for some t ∈ (0, 1) (wheret 1 − t). Then
where the second inequality follows by Hölder's inequality. Taking the logarithm of both sides of the above proves (ii). Convexity of the functions F 0 and G 0 is established using the above two lemmas as follows:
A. Convexity of G 0 Set a i = P X|Z (x|z) and b i = P X|Z (x|z)
PX (x)
in Lemma 5 and then use Lemma 6 part (i).
B. Convexity of F 0
Set a i = P X|Z (x|z) and b i = P X|Z (x|z)
in Lemma 5 and then use Lemma 6 part (ii).
